The disinterested self: the idealized subject of life assurance 
and on the other, the desire for a form of financial planning for an uncertain future that could claim both prudence and piety.
That said, the progress of life assurance, was far from smooth. Even in Britain, where it met least resistance, the history of life assurance was one of 'false starts' and 'pervasive failure' (Clark, 1999: 71) . 2 More than one hundred years elapsed between the formation of the first English societies and the widespread diffusion of the practice in the mid-nineteenth century. (Cockerell & Green, 1976) . This delay has been attributed to an entrenched resistance to life assurance on the grounds of its perceived defiance of a normative division between the marketable and non-marketable, or the sacred and profane.
Overcoming such resistance, it has been argued, required the development of sophisticated marketing techniques and the adoption of a quasi-religious product concept in which life assurance was connoted with the blessed, paternalist task of protecting widows and orphans (Zelizer, 1979; Davidoff & Hall, 1987) . Whilst not inaccurate as such, this offers only a partial and relatively superficial account of the activities of the nascent life assurance industry.
Prior to the Gambling Act of 1774, the customs and practices of life assurance were so closely bound up with some of the most outrageous forms of speculation on the duration of individual human lives that the respectability life assurance attained by the mid-nineteenth century is quite remarkable 3 .
Whilst eighteenth century life assurance institutions, as Clark (1999) has persuasively demonstrated, did not revolve exclusively around opportunistic speculation, the shift from a plural and hugely varied set of practices in the eighteenth century to a relatively uniform system grounded in claims to actuarial knowledge by the mid nineteenth century was still one of enormous magnitude. This shift required not only the promulgation of a quasi-sacred product-image but the amalgamation of this image with the regularity and certainty which seemed to be offered by mathematical knowledge (Daston, 1988) . Life assurance thereby became the exemplary financial technology of the orderly, pious and prudent in part because of its apparent basis in objective, scientific laws. This is not something that life assurance companies could have achieved by marketing alone. Indeed the primary aim of this paper is to argue that this shift is comprehensible only when set in context of the ascending political rationality and the changing status of knowledge, numbers and science with which this rationality was associated in the run-up to the nineteenth century. Life assurance is a technology which operates by the deliberate and explicit collectivization of risk. In a strict mathematical sense, risk exists as a characteristic of groups and cannot usefully be applied to individuals (Ewald, 1991) . The purposeful recognition of this in the way that nineteenth century life assurance sought, at a cost, to offer individual protection against life's contingencies by developing processes that worked by spreading risk across populations, qualifies it as an archetypal technology of liberal governmentality. In allowing people the benefits of collective association whilst promoting individual market-based freedoms, nineteenth century life assurance sought to induce people to accept, as a personal and social duty, the management of their future financial safety. This appeal was bolstered by a claimed basis in the statistical 'certainties' of population, health and mortality embodied in the emerging actuarial sciences.
Thus two key planks of liberal political rationality: the appeal to self-interest and what Porter (1996) described as the 'gentle' exercise of power through statistics are, in theory at least, united in life assurance. The articulation between these two planks and two central tenets prominent in the promotional discourses of life assurance -'selfless' self-interest and the law of mortality -will form the basis of discussion in the two main sections of the paper.
'The most enlightened and benevolent form that projects of self-interest ever took'
In describing life assurance as an enlightened and benevolent form of self-interest the mathematician, Augustus de Morgan, (cited in Phillips, 1857: 28) set the tone for what became one of the most frequently reiterated claims in the plethora of promotional material that emanated from nineteenth century life assurance companies. Although British life assurance has a history dating back to the seventeenth century it became firmly established in the nineteenth century in a context in which an increasingly voracious appetite for financial and commercial products and advice was matched by an avalanche of publications combining moral themes with scientific reasoning and commercial appeal 4 . As Davidoff and Hall (1987) observe, a powerful combination of commercial, scientific and religious ideas circulated in an array of printed materials which begun at the start of the century to take the place of the proverbial wisdom found in old style almanacs.
Printed discussion on the matter of life assurance came in a bewildering range of forms. Such characterizations of the inherent propriety, prudence and piety of the practice of life assurance ran deep. No company prospectus was complete without some reference to the intrinsic benevolence of the institution albeit that the reference may simply be to the superfluity of mentioning again this manifest and incontrovertible characteristic 6 . These sentiments were also deeply ingrained within promotional imagery in endless variations of pseudo-religious and mythological themes of helpless widows and orphans safely cocooned from external threats. Figure 1 , drawn from an 1850 Standard Life bonus announcement is typical of the style. Bonuses were announced as part of the regular division of profits back to policyholders at five or seven yearly intervals. The calculation and declaration of the bonus, as
Alborn (2002) has argued, became, almost by accident, a primary element of the working practices of insurance companies and its importance to their overall marketing strategy has to be appreciated. The appearance of elaborate illustrations of this type on the bonus notification and often on prospectuses and other leaflets (which would also, invariably, refer back to the last bonus) thus reveals something of how insurance companies sought to represent their business. This deliberate association of life assurance with the virtually selfless, almost sacred, matter of protecting the helpless has been construed as a tactic calculated to dispel residual fears that insuring betrayed an impious, if not blasphemous, lack of faith in providence (Daston, 1988; Zelizer, 1979) .
Undoubtedly this formed part of the motive but beliefs about the fundamental civil, religious and moral 'goods' that could result from marshalling particular forms of self-interest calculated to meet specific ends were also part of how the concept and business of life assurance was constituted. Clark (1999) describes how prudent, collective and altruistic aspirations coexisted alongside some of the worst excesses of gambling and speculation in the embryonic institutions of the eighteenth century. The motives at work in early life assurance, he maintains, were so mixed that they in fact do not bear separation 'into neat behavioural categories of speculation and prudence, as some historians implicitly relying on modernization theory have sought to do ' (1999: 187) . What I am proposing is that although the mutual collectivist visions of some eighteenth century institutions did increasingly give way to the profit-making endeavours of proprietary and mutual companies 7 this does not, in itself, render transparent the motives of these companies. The goal of much nineteenth century marketplace activity was, as Davidoff and Hall, (1987) In concluding this general outline of the origin and progress of the society, and on looking back to that first meeting at which it was declared to be constituted, and when the late, venerable and reverend, Dr Johnston of North Leith (who presided) in a manner beautifully consistent with the exalted piety of his own character and the benevolent design of the Institution, opened and consecrated the business by the utterance of solemn prayer, our first and strongest feeling must be that of humble gratitude to the Supreme Disposer of Events, under whose divine blessing it has been conducted through many early and arduous difficulties to its present secure and prosperous situation. This document clearly sought to offer a favourable account of the society to its members but it is not directed at an external market nor is it primarily a promotional tool. As such it offers an insight into the how the company understood and defined the project of life assurance and more particularly how this linked to broader questions about the role self-interest might play in the emerging civil society. Such an insight however requires abandoning the critical habit of classifying all forms of commercial promotional activity as symptomatic of the cynical exploitation of a market opportunity. This is a habit which treats the 'cultural' representations found in promotional material as entirely separable and distinct from the 'real' economic character of the originating institutions 8 . The approach I am advocating defines culture, not as a pre-existing, autonomous, 'outside' to economic practices, but as constituted, in Hunter's (1988) phrase, only in relation, to the 'delimited norms and forms of calculation' made available through specific historical institutions of which life assurance companies provide only one example. Similarly, it requires setting aside, for the moment, the sociological inkblot association of rational self interested conduct with negative, inhibiting effects on the human personality (du Gay, 2005) . This is something of a prerequisite to recognizing the ways in which the category of "selfinterest" has varied conceptually and materially over the last three centuries and the particular purposes for which it has been mobilized (cf du Gay, 2005; Force, 2003; Hirschman, 1977) . Notwithstanding the catastrophes with which the pursuit of self-interest is often associated, the epistemological history of the concept does not have to be mined too deeply to uncover a very different set of associations.
The modern usage of the term self-interest as a form of self-serving behaviour particularly in relation to economic ends can be traced to the early eighteenth century. It was during this period, according to Poovey (1998: 86) , that self-interest acquired particular valency as an effective 'instrument of rule' in an emerging 'reason of state' political philosophy. In the logic of reason of state, Poovey argues, political and economic activity alike were conceived as contests for personal gain and the most efficacious form of government was that which recognised self-interest as what all men share 9 . This does not in itself mean that for reason of state thinkers self-interest lay at the core of every man's being.
On the contrary, for thinkers like Hobbes and Hume, it was not self-interest but massive irrationality and impulsiveness which drove human behaviour and had lead to the disastrous consequences of protracted and bloody civil wars (du Gay, 2005; Hunter, 2001; Saunders, 1997) . For Hobbes, the prevention of civil war was the only goal in an urgent choice between 'spiritual civil war and worldly civil peace' (Saunders, 1997: 4) . It is against this historical backdrop that the deliberate cultivation of self-interest as an ethical project makes sense as a governmental strategy. This should not be construed as simply a matter of 'rolling back the state' to release individuals to the unfettered pursuit of their own private economic gain. In fact, in the context of early modern Europe, considerable effort was required to construct the self-interested subject.
[B]efore an individual can act on the basis of their own 'interests' they must first become the sort of person disposed to and capable of relating to themselves as the responsible agents of their own conduct. In 17 th and 18 th century Europe … an enormous amount of work went into supplying the cultural 'equipment', the norms and mechanisms necessary to cultivating such dispositions and capacities among populations culturally habituated to other, frequently antithetical, ideals and forms of conduct. (du Gay, 2005: 396) Much of the work of early life assurance companies can be understood in this light. Alongside the development of actuarial techniques and knowledges, life assurance companies appear to have devoted a huge amount of effort to translating the practice of insurance into a form that would chime with existing ideals of conduct. The continual repetition of messages about the prudence and piety of insuring can be read in this light. Life assurance was not the only method of financial planning available and particular emphasis was placed on establishing the differences between life assurance and saving in not only practical but also in moral terms. The great unique selling point of life assurance was that the sum assured became realizable as capital in the event of death from the moment the policy was taken. Thus, where it might take many years to set aside a given sum by saving, the sum assured would be realizable even if only one premium had been paid. Life assurance companies of course made much of this feature but were equally keen to emphasize its moral advantages. Individuals who set aside funds for the future well-being of their dependents via insurance were strictly separated from those funds. Then, as now, the early surrender of insurance polices would result in punitive financial penalties. This, in large part, countered the temptation to dip in but assuring had other, even finer, moral benefits. Life assurance, the Scottish Widows Fund claimed 'completely obviates all those baneful evils into which a habit of saving is apt to degenerate, for such a habit although originally springing from most proper and legitimate motives, not infrequently ends in debasing the mind to a disposition of avaricious hoarding. (Pamphlet, 1837, Box 7, Insurance Series, JJ)
Avaricious hoarding then was to be avoided but securing adequate means for the future well-being of dependents through a little self-denial was not. Life assurance companies devoted their sizeable energies into ensuring that their agents knew just how to explain to prospects the means by which the price of a premium might be secured even by those of limited means 10 . The following extract from an agents' manual offers particularly explicit advice.
to the industrial classes, the mechanic, the artisan, and the labourer, agricultural or otherwise -show that by the saving of a few pence weekly or by abstinence form the alehouse, and the gin-shop, or even the mere abridgment of half-a pint of his daily modicum of beer, he may secure a provision for his wife and family when he is in the grave … To the middle classes of society, show by what small increments the means of saving may be obtained by self-denial. As it has been said a few tavern visits less, an occasional mislaying of the key of the wine cellar, a tight stopper in the spirit bottle, a few less cigars smoked, a waterside visit put off till next year, a party omitted to be given, a slight forgetfulness of the length of time a coat or a silk gown has been worn, a few less fly or cab fares to parties or scenes of amusement, Sunday trips in steamboats or on railroads, omnibus fares, and a thousand other matters of the kind, present an ample variety of sources for furnishing the small annual sum requisite to insure an ample provision for a family, when its natural protector can no longer provide a maintenance for them but is numbered with the dead (GD294/29: 16; NAS).
In this way life assurance companies sought to define insuring as a particular sort of ethical practice of self interest. Purchasing life assurance was 'not spending, but saving' (United Kingdom Temperance and General Provident Institution, 1887; Box 8, JJ); it was 'not a private but a public benefit' (Mentor Life Assurance prospectus, Box 4, JJ) it was, in sum, 'a moral, social and religious duty' (RisboroughSarman, 1868, BOD). What this is pointing to, to paraphrase Callon (1998) , is a very particular formatting, framing and equipping of the life assurance subject as one engaged in a disinterested pursuit of self-interest. This is not to say that the matter of self-interest was uncontroversial by the nineteenth century. It is quite clear that self-interest was not only construed in a variety of different ways but also met with a variety of reactions from hostile opprobrium, to cautious acceptance to enthusiastic embrace (cf Poovey, 1998; du Gay, 2003) . Life assurance companies' continual reiteration that insurance was not only, not primarily or not exclusively a prudent financial strategy makes sense, in part, as a rejoinder to persistent reservations about the compatibility of self-interest and pious, moral conduct. This was a particular problem for the credibility of the many companies who relied primarily on commissioned agents to explain the benefits of life assurance to new customers. How could the advice of self-interested agents be trusted? In one pamphlet, the anonymous author who claimed only a policyholder's general 'interest' in the matter referred to public defensiveness against agents' approaches.
They do not doubt all he says, they appreciate all his arguments, and they cannot deny his conclusions, but -he is an interested party; it is his business to talk thus … Now it is true that the Insurance Agent is not actuated by motives of pure philanthropy in approaching you, but is that any reason you should listen to him with deaf ears, and harden your heart against him? … Supposing an Insurance Agent is trying to make a 'Com.' out of you, is that any reason why you should reject the obvious advantages offered to you? He confers a vastly greater benefit upon you if he induces you to make this investment than you confer upon him by intrusting him with your 'proposal. (24788.e.11 (2) , 1888: 15; BOD)
Such defensiveness was not unwarranted. Despite the mountains of paper devoted to reassuring the public as to the soundness of the principle and practice of 'respectable' insurance companies there was sufficient concern and evidence concerning the operation of 'bogus' offices to compel Parliament in 1853 to appoint a Select Committee of Inquiry into Assurance Associations which nevertheless failed to prevent the notorious public collapse of the Albert and European assurance companies in 1868 (cf.
Clifford, 1876; Insurance Policyholders' Mutual Protection League, 1888). Part of the problem was that no amount of paper could counter the very real confusion that lay at the heart of actuarial practice or the complexity and contentiousness of its emerging principles (Hacking, 1990; Daston, 1988) That this parody struck at the heart of much broader concerns about the operation of interest, selfinterest and disinterestedness is suggested by the brief notoriety of the character of Mr Pecksniff. In the novel, Pecksniff's disinterested humility is presented as a mannered disguise for his deeply rooted self-seeking avarice. For many months after the novel was first serialized in the mid 1840s the magazine Punch seized on the character of Pecksniff as the true identity of the then Prime Minister Robert Peel.
This satirical parallel was fuelled by the 'temporary' introduction of income tax under Peel's administration. The caption below ran as follows:
We have heard that Mr Charles Dickens is about to apply to the Court of Chancery for an injunction to prevent Sir Robert Peel continuing any longer to personate, in his capacity of Premier, the character of Mr Pecksniff, as delineated in Martin Chuzzlewit, that character being copyright. We hope this rumour is unfounded, as the injunction would certainly be refused. Sir Robert Peel is in a condition to prove that the part in question has been enacted by him for a long series of years, and was so, long before any of Mr Dickens's works appeared; in short, that he, Sir Robert Peel, is the original Pecksniff. (1846 (11): 25) 11 What this points to is the contested character of matters of interest, self-interest and disinterestedness in the particular context of life assurance. Despite the persistence and ingenuity of these critiques 12 and satires, life assurance and the special form of self-interest it trumpeted was quite firmly established by the second half of the nineteenth century. In the next section the aim is to uncover how closely this achievement depended upon the claim to precision and accuracy of the laws underpinning actuarial science.
'Equalizing to the survivors of a short life, the fruits of a long one'.
13
The phrase above represented one of the ways in which the knowledges and science upon which life assurance was based was translated into a customer benefit in promotional literature. It was a phrase deployed to illustrate the benefits to be accrued from a fulsome understanding of the operation of 'natural laws' to prospective customers. Life assurance, so this logic went, was to be trusted because it was underpinned by an appreciation of fixed laws and mathematical certainties and in particular the 'law of mortality'. This, ostensibly banal, promotional tactic offers an insight into the shifting relations between interests, trust and religion on the one hand and objectivity, proof and science on the other. This section explores how the law of mortality was represented in the promotional literature in a way that sought to render the economic interests of life assurance companies as secondary and incidental to the discovery of a grand mathematical secret that could be manipulated to the benefit of all.
In his analysis of how quantitative methods attained the prestige and power they hold in the modern world, Porter (1996) describes objectivity as a set of strategies for dealing with distance and distrust. In offering the rule of law as an alternative to that of men, objectivity promises the subordination of personal interests to public standards. Science and calculation are cast by thinkers like Karl Pearson, in moral terms as successors to religion. Science admits;
… no interested motive, no working to support a policy, an individual or a theory; such action but leads to the distortion of knowledge, and those who do not seek truth from an unbiased standpoint, are in the theology of freethought, ministers in the devil's synagogue. (Pearson, in Porter, 1996: 75) What strict adherence to scientific and calculative methods seemed to provide was a pious ritual that could expel the 'demon of interestedness ' (Porter, 1996: 75) . In a similar vein, nineteenth century statisticians championed a science that could average away 'everything contingent, accidental, inexplicable or personal' to leave behind only large scale regularities (1996: 85) . This was by no means the only account of the developing knowledges of science and statistics in circulation in the nineteenth century (cf. Hacking, 1990; Poovey, 1998; Porter, 1996) but it was undoubtedly the one that insurance companies chose to trumpet in their promotional literature. The following extracts are typical of the way the 'law of mortality' was described in insurance company prospectuses and pamphlets.
Life assurance as a system is based on the fact that human life, proverbially the most uncertain of all
things, yet follows, in the aggregate, a fixed law, the operation of which as has been well said, is almost as certain as that of gravitation. So that while we cannot tell how long any one man may live, we are enabled, by the study of mortality, to predict with singular exactness how many men out of any large body will die the chief actuary of the National Debt Office, gave his judgement that while life and death were subject to a known law of nature, sickness was not (Hacking, 1990: 47-55) . Faced with the disastrous prospect of the debt arising from the potential bankruptcy of Friendly Societies, which had no actuarial information to guide the pricing of premiums, the Committee urgently wanted firmer tables on the probability of sickness. By the time the report was released in July, the committee claimed that
Finlaison, having 'paid further attention to the subject, has finally expressed his conviction, that sickness may be reduced to an almost certain law ' (cited in Hacking, 1990: 47) . The Committee, however were guilty of some economy with the truth, Finlaison in fact, offered sickness tables as instructed, but with the disclaimer that the tables followed a hypothesis 'hazarded, merely as speculation ' (cited in Hacking, 1990: 47) . Far from endorsing a fixed law of sickness, Finlaison, came, in the light of data emerging through the 1820s, to doubt also the existence of a law of mortality. Whatever the opinion of specialist actuaries, it could not counter the political and commercial appetite for certainty expressed in laws, tables and figures, as a mechanism for launching 'a practical attack on an immediate and material problem' (Hacking, 1990: 48) . The periodical press were by 1840, full of laws and tables of all kinds while the publicity surrounding insurance institutions admitted to no uncertainty regarding the law of mortality.
The certainty of these emerging 'laws' and 'facts' was nonetheless something of a fiction in the sense that they could not be traced in a direct lineage back to an incontrovertible 'nature'. As genealogical historians of science and knowledge have shown, the special prestige attached to the 'sciences' was not preordained but the outcome of a long, negotiated and incremental process (cf. Hacking, 1990; Poovey, 1998; Porter, 1996) . This does not amount to questioning the validity or truth of scientific discoveries in themselves, but rather is meant, following Porter (1996) , to point to the generative or 'performative' role of specific 'technologies of trust' in securing the status and acceptance of these discoveries. 14 Viewed in this light, 'the law of mortality' is not a pure fiction but an object that originated in part from the creative power of statistics and came to have a very solid, material basis in the practices of insurance companies. This status was secured despite the continuing contest amongst actuaries, statisticians and others about whether in fact a general law of mortality had any meaningful basis or application to insurance associations. As the newly formed Institute of Actuaries put it in 1852;
'the notion that there is a 'fixed' rate of mortality and a 'fixed' rate of sickness is evidently untenable.
There is reason to believe that these rates differ in every insurance association, not widely perhaps but characteristically ' (cited in Porter, 1996: 38) .
Insurance presented actuaries with the 'local' problem of calculating the dependent risks which applied in a given company, at a given time. It was in part a function of this local variability that actuaries sought recognition, not merely as technical specialists, but as a liberal profession that demanded the skills of both calculation and judgement. Judgement, not calculation, was required to enable companies to balance their risks through the skilful selection of lives. In order to secure admission to a life assurance company, the life of the 'proposed' had to be deemed of sufficient quality to merit insuring; 'the door of an insurance office being shut against a whitened tongue or a quickened pulse' (GD294/29: 16; NAS). The method of selection took a variety of forms from 'an appearance before the board' in the early part of the century to a medical examination in the later decades (GD294/53; NAS). These methods of judgement were calculated to enable companies to insure only 'select lives', a category that was seized upon as a key marker of the safety of insurance companies.
The strictness of these regulations may perhaps occasionally deprive the society of business … but the directors disregard this, that it is much more than compensated by the inducements which these very
Regulations hold out to parties of good health and habits, desirous of making assurances in the most Judgement could not be replaced by calculation, no matter how precise the method, actuaries maintained, because of the local variability of the phenomena -even the strongest, general rules were useful only in the hands of those who understood the conditions under which they should be applied (Porter, 1996) . Nonetheless judgement was never advocated by actuaries as an alternative to calculation, sound calculation was integral to the long term success and solvency of the companies. It was only through exhaustive calculation that, for example, it could be shown that even those companies with large reserves would face insolvency when their members grew older. Thus, as Porter explains, judgement in life assurance was deployed as 'a set of strategies for setting up the computation and then adjusting its results ' (1996: 105) .
Concluding Comments [Self-interest] speaks all sorts of languages and plays all sorts of roles, even that of the disinterested person' (La Rochefoucauld, 1665 in Force, 2003 .
Nineteenth century life assurance companies performed a really quite magnificent balancing act between the competing claims of religion and science, disinterestedness and interest, beliefs and objectivity.
They sought to develop a lucrative financial industry based on sound actuarial principles by offering to their customers a peculiar admixture of pious sentiment and plausible science. The coup de grace lay in deploying claims about the laws and science of mortality to neutralise both residual fears about the impiety of life assurance and questions about their own 'interestedness' in the transaction. It would be a mistake to read this as a stroke of evil genius on the part of the insurance industry -irrespective of the propriety or 'rottenness' of individual companies. It is better understood as offering a prospect of the delicate material processes, practices and negotiations in play in the knowledges of wealth and society and their developing fit with the emerging mode of liberal governmentality. If insurance companies glossed over some of the complexities of actuarial law, calculation and practice for the sake of expediency this was a strategy they shared with policymakers who saw in numbers a way of rendering populations knowable and therefore governable. As Poovey (1998: 123) remarks of William Petty's political arithmetic, the representation of expert interpretation as superior to personal interests helped forge the relationship between numbers and impartiality that has made the modern fact a crucial tool for policymakers. Like Petty, the practices of life assurance companies, could be read as deploying expert knowledges to link 'particulars that seemed to be (but were not) observed to theories that seemed not to be (but were) interested,' (Poovey, 1998: 123) thereby enabling interpretation (and interest) to appear incidental to method and instrument. Through just such a manoeuvre, the self-interest of the practice of insuring -for the insurers if not the assured -assumed the guise of disinterest.
